In this paper, we address the causes of the Roaring Twenties in the United States. In particular, we use a version of the real business cycle model to test the hypothesis that an extraordinary pace of productivity growth was the driving factor. Our motivation comes from the abundance of evidence of significant technological progress during this period, fed by innovations in manufacturing and the widespread introduction of electricity. Our estimated total factor productivity series generate artificial model output that shows high conformity with the data: the model economy sucessfully replicates the boom years from 1922-1929. JEL Classification: E32, N12.
Introduction
" [The 1920s ] represent nearly seven years of unparalleled plenty [...] during which the businessman was, as Stuart Chase put it, 'the dictator of our destinies,'ousting 'the statesman, the priest, the philosopher, as the creator of standards of ethics and behavior'and becoming 'the …nal authority on the conduct of American society.' For nearly seven years, the prosperity band-wagon rolled down Main Street." [Allen, 1931, 133] After surviving the woebegone 1920-21 recession, the United States'annualized per capita output grew at a staggering pace of over 3.3 percent for the rest of the decade -about 1.5 percentage points higher than the 20th century average. What caused this unique episode in U.S. economic history? In this paper, we address this issue in the context of a neoclassical model of the business cycle. In particular, we use a version of the real business cycle (RBC) model to test the hypothesis that an extraordinary pace of productivity growth was the driving factor. 1 We also provide historical evidence of such growth. This paper is not the …rst to apply neoclassical modeling techniques to the prewar era. Ohanian (1999, 2004) and Bordo, Erceg and Evans (2000) , among others, evaluate the ability of RBC or sticky price money models to explain the Great Depression. In addition, Harrison and Weder (2006) assess the possibility that a model in which self-ful…lling beliefs (aka sunspots) drive business cycles might explain it. They provide evidence that extrinsic pessimism starting in 1930 turned what might have been a recession into the Great Depression.
Our goal here is to follow the lead taken by the above authors by extending the analysis to the experience of the US economy during the Roaring Twenties. 2 We believe that the RBC approach is an appropriate framework to attack this issue, not only because of its elegant simplicity and success in explaining postwar cycles, but also in light of considerable evidence of much technological progress during the Roaring Twenties. In fact, the current paper is the …rst that numerically evaluates the general equilibrium 1 We de…ne real business cycles in the sense of " [...] recurrent ‡uctuations in an economy's incomes, products, and factor inputs -especially labor -that are due to nonmonetary sources." [McGrattan, 2006, 1] . However, here we stress solely technological progress. 2 We acknowledge that other factors might have contributed to the Roaring Twenties. (See for example Harrison and Weder, 2008.) However, the goal here is to examine the e¤ects of technological changes in isolation.
e¤ects of how and by how much identi…ed productivity gains during the 1920s translated into the unwonted boom in U.S. economic activity.
As will be seen in more detail in the next Section, total factor productivity (TFP) growth during the 1920s was persistently above trend (shown in Figure 1 ). In addition, beginning right after the recession of 1920-21, output remained above trend for the entire decade. As does Field (2006) , we attribute these TFP improvements to innovations that originated in manufacturing, which were chie ‡y made possible by switching production to the use of electricity:
"[e]xtraordinary across-the-board gains from exploiting small electric motors, and recon…guring factories from the multistory pattern that mechanical distribution of steam power required to the one story layout that was now possible. [Field, 2006, p 216] In other words, innovations like the automobile industry's assembly line, the adoption of electric power and the use of the frictional horsepower electric motor led to increases in production possibilities in many sectors of the economy. We present detailed evidence in the next Section.
To evaluate the widespread e¤ects that innovations in manufacturing and the switch to electricity had on the aggregate economy, we feed modelconsistent estimates of TFP into a calibrated general equilibrium model. We use the canonical version of the RBC model, with the one added feature that utilization of the capital stock can vary over the cycle. We examine versions of the model, however, both with and without this feature. Without it, TFP is the standard Solow residual; while with this feature, our estimate of TFP takes into account a model-consistent measure of utilization.
Our data cover the period 1892-1941. In our analysis we examine the success of each model over the entire period, though our focus is on the 1920s. In particular, we examine each model's ability to replicate both the expansive nature of the decade in general, and the three recessions that occurred: one large, from 1920 :I to 1921 and two milder, from 1923 :II to 1924 :III, and 1926 :III to 1927 :IV. The models get the timing of the …rst two recessions wrong, as in each case the negative technology shocks come too late. On the other hand, a fall in productive capacity does accompany the last recession. In addition, our results indicate that increases in the level of technology during the 1920s are essential for understanding its roaring nature, i.e. the above trend growth. The correlations over this period between model and data for the two models are 0.84 and 0.58 respectively. Eliminating the …rst, deepest recession, these correlations rise to 0.92 and 0.73. Our conclusion is that the standard RBC model replicates the data extremely well, while adjusting for variable utilization of capital weakens the power of the model. 3 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we outline the technological experiences of the Roaring Twenties, providing supporting evidence, in historical perspective. Section 3 describes the model; and in Section 4 we present our results. Section 5 concludes.
The Roaring Twenties
"Pick up one of those graphs with which statisticians measure the economic ups and downs of the Post-war Decade. You will …nd that the line of business activity rises to a jagged peak in 1920, drops precipitously into a deep valley in late 1920 and 1921, climbs uncertainly upward through 1922 to another peak at the middle of 1923, dips somewhat in 1924 (but not nearly so far as in 1921), rises again in 1925 and zigzags up to a perfect Everest of prosperity in 1929-only to plunge down at last into the bottomless abyss of 1930 and 1931. Hold the graph at arm'slength and glance at it again, and you will see that the clefts of 1924 and 1927 are mere indentations in a lofty and irregular plateau which reaches from early 1923 to late 1929." [Allen, 1931, 132f] In this Section we provide economic background on the Roaring Twenties, from the perspective of technological change. We begin with data on output and on TFP, and conclude with evidence of speci…c innovations that were key factors in determining the growth experience of the 1920s. Table 1 provides more evidence of the remarkable growth in output during the 1920s. It contains, in the …rst column, data on per capita output growth over the period of our sample. The selection of periods follows Field (2003 Field ( , 2006 Field ( , 2008 , whose aim is to measure peak-to-peak performances of growth cycles. (1892 is the …rst peak year for which Kendrick's Olney, 1991) de…ne the Roaring Twenties as starting after it. In fact, some of the highest growth occurs right after it, or as Allen notes:
Output
"The hopeless depression of 1921 had given way to the hopeful improvement of 1922 and the rushing revival of 1923." [Allen, 1931, 132] 
Technology
Also included in Table 1 is TFP growth rates using Kendrick's (1961) measure of TFP: the ratio of GNP to an index of total factor input. This input measure is a factor share-weighted average of aggregate capital input and labor input. TFP growth picks up starting in 1919. While the same peak-topeak interpretation does not apply here, the growth of TFP from 1921-1929 is virtually identical to that of the period Field (2003) coined the "most technologically progressive decade," the 1930s. In addition, as seen in Figure 1 , just like output, the cyclical component of TFP remains above-trend from [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] . Over no other period in our sample does such a prolonged positive deviation from trend occur. 5 For consistency with our theoretical model, Figure 3 displays TFP using a calibrated Cobb-Douglas production function with a labor share of 67 
Technological change during the 1920s
"Within business cycle research, some open questions remain. What is the source of large cyclical movements in TFP? [...] Are movements in TFP primarily due to new inventions and processes that are, by the nature of research and development, stochastically discovered? Or are movements in TFP primarily due to changing government regulations that may alter the e¢ -ciency of production? Are they due to unmeasured investments that ‡uctuate over time?" [McGrattan, 2006, 9] There is much evidence to support the measured surge in TFP during the 1920s, in the form of technological change. In particular, we argue that the economy-wide innovations were driven by two factors: (1) improvements made in manufacturing, and (2) the widespread adoptions of electricity, and the frictional horsepower electric motor in particular.
Support for both of these comes from the contemporary Report of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes of the President's Conference on Unemployment (1929):
"The increased supply of power and its wider uses; the multiplication by man of his strength and skill through machinery, the expert division and arrangement of work in mines and factories, on the farms, and in the trades, so that production per man hour of e¤ort has risen to new heights." [1929, p ix-x] The e¤ects of these changes were exactly what one would expect from positive technology shocks: "[...] both energy savings and increased productivity in manufacturing contributed to the dramatic change in the energy-GNP ratio around 1920." [Devine, 1983, 372] 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 TFP (detrended) Real gross GNP per energy consumption (excluding wood)
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Figure 5: Trends in US energy consumption, original source of energy data: Schurr and Netschert (1960) The importance of technological change in manufacturing is central to Field (2006) , who reports that the surge in TFP …rst and foremost originated in that sector. Over the 1919-1929 span, manufacturing TFP's annual growth rate was 5.12 percent: more than double the 2.02 percent average for the aggregate economy.
Likewise, Oshima (1984) attributes much of the growth in the economy to that in manufacturing:
"Mechanization raised output per worker at a faster rate than could be accomplished with the steam-driven technology of the nineteenth century [...] . The new machines -faster, more powerful [...] raised per capita output." [Oshima, 1984, p 161] .
Perhaps the most-cited innovation in manufacturing during this period is Ford's adoption of the assembly line, realized between 1908 and 1913. Motor vehicle production rose tenfold from 1913 to 1928; and by the end of the 1920s, sixty percent of American families owned an automobile (Smiley, 2008) .
The adoption of mass production, aided by the specialization of the assembly line, followed in many other industries, including communication, transportation, and consumer appliances:
"[Executives'] con…dence was strengthened by their almost invincible ally. And they were all of them aided by the boom in the automobile industry. The phenomenal activity of this one part of the body economic-which was responsible, directly or indirectly, for the employment of nearly four million menpumped new life into all the rest." [Allen, 1931, 139] The other important source of growth during the 1920s was the expanding use of electricity in production -the "[...] lever to increase production." [Devine, 1983, 363] Kyvig notes: "Electric current, generated and controlled for human use, was not a new phenomenon by the 1920s, but, as with the automobile, in that decade it …rst came to be used by a multitude of people." [Kyvig, 2002, 43] .
In 1919, 55% of manufacturing's power was supplied by electricity. By 1929, this number had increased to 82% (Atack and Passell, 1994) . Figures  5 and 6 illustrate. Figure 5 shows the marked increase in the productivity of energy (i.e. the energy-GNP ratio as mentioned by Devine, 1983) in the United States starting in 1917. Its general pattern is very similar to the (detrended) aggregate TFP series. Figure 6 plots the upward surge of electricity production -electric power production almost tripled from 1919 to 1929.
The innovations in manufacturing and the adoption of electricity resulted in a plethora of further inventions that were widespread and spurred on growth. These included radios, which helped to revolutionize the advertising business. After the …rst radio broadcast by KDKA Pittsburgh in November 1920, sales of radio sets, parts and accessories surged from $60 million in 1922 to over $842 million by 1929. Among the long list of other product inventions is irons, toasters, television and vacuum cleaners. Retail also exploded, with Sears opening stores in 1924 -previously, they were strictly mail order. Montgomery Ward and Woolworth, along with several grocery stores, followed (Smiley, 2008) .
As an aside, Allen (1931) discusses the adoption of a more sophisticated organization of production, which likely also contributed to the observed dampening of the cycle: "Executives, remembering with a shudder the piled-up inventories of 1921, had learned the lesson of cautious hand-to-mouth buying; and they were surrounded with more expert technical consultants, research men, personnel managers, statisticians, and business forecasters than ever before invaded that cave of the winds, the conference room." [Allen, 1931, 139] Despite the overall expansionary nature of the decade, there were 3 recessions. While the …rst was certainly a post-WWI decline, it is also often blamed on inept monetary policy. The third may have been related to Ford's closing of his factories to switch from Model T to Model A: "The 1927 recession was also associated with Henry Ford's shut-down of all his factories for six months in order to changeover from the Model T to the new Model A automobile. Though the Model T's market share was declining after 1924, in 1926 Ford's Model T still made up nearly 40 percent of all the new cars produced and sold in the United States." [Smiley, 2008] Below we examine our theory's ability to replicate the cycles that occurred during the Roaring Twenties, as well as the economically expansive nature of the decade in general.
The arti…cial economy
The arti…cial economy is a one-sector dynamic general equilibrium model with variable capital utilization. We assume that the economy is populated by identical consumer-worker households of measure one, each of which lives forever. There are N t family members in every household in period t. The problem faced by a representative household is
and k 0 is given. We restrict the parameters 0 < < 1, 0 < < 1, and 0 < < 1. The variables c t , h t , k t , and u t denote consumption, labor, capital (all in per capita terms) and the capital utilization rate. As in most studies with variable capital utilization, the rate of depreciation, t , is an increasing function of the utilization rate, hence > 1. This formulation follows Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988) . The constant population growth rate is given by n. Labor-augmenting technology, A t , grows at the constant rate a. We denote productivity shocks by z t , and assume that they follow the standard AR(1) process. All markets are perfectly competitive. The …rst order conditions entail
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We calibrate our economy to averages of the US economy over our sample period. 6 The fundamental period is a year. We set = 0:33; which corresponds to the capital share for the private domestic economy in 1929 (see also Johnson, 1954) . In addition, a = 0:015 and n = 0:019. These numbers conform to our TFP and population measures' average growth rates. Lastly, we set the discount factor at = 0:96 and the steady state rate of physical capital depreciation at = 0:055; which we take directly from McGrattan and Ohanian (2007) . Together, these values imply a capital to output ratio of 2:5, which is the average of Maddison's (1991) …gures for the US gross non-residential capital stock to GDP ratio for 1890 and 1913. The calibration produces a consumption share of 77 percent. This is close to the average for 1892 to 1941, 75 percent (GNP, Commerce Department concept, derivation from Kuznets'estimates, from Kendrick, 1961) . The parameter is set such that households spent one third of their time endowment working. Lastly, is pinned down by the steady state conditions
Results
In this Section, we present our results. Our goal is to examine the ability of technology shocks in the model economy to replicate the US experience of the 1920s. First, we assume a constant capital utilization rate in production. Here, total factor productivity is simply the naive Solow residual. Then, we allow for the richness given to the model by allowing this rate to vary over time.
Standard real business cycle model
We start with the plain vanilla model, in which capital utilization remains constant. 7 Our …rst step is to estimate TFP via the standard Solow residual. This is accomplished by setting u t = 1 for all periods in the production function and solving for z t : Under our calibration, we have The resulting series fz t g ; as well as its log-linear detrended version and innovations, were presented in Figures 3 and 4 . As mentioned in Section 2.2, the detrended TFP time series is well-described by an AR(1) process.
Recall that TFP underwent a signi…cant surge upward starting in 1923. It then remained above-trend until the end of the decade, at which point it collapsed. Next, we feed the computed series fz t g into the arti…cial economy. Our detrending method suggests that Kendrick's 1892 capital input was about 15 percent below the 1892 to 1941 trend. Therefore, we start with an initial capital stock 15 below the steady state. This assumption impacts the beginning of the simulation, but has no e¤ect on the results for the 1920s. 8 Figure 7 compares arti…cial output and US data, starting with 1919. The US data are detrended by their 1892 to 1941 trend; and both series are scaled to equal 100 in 1929. Over this period, the correlation between model and data is 0.60. More relevant for us, the model is extremely successful in replicating the overall experience of the 1920s: this correlation is 0.84, and for the period from 1922-1929 there is an almost perfect …t (0.92). Just like in the data, the model's 1920s peak is in 1926; and the 1929 value is indistinguishable from this peak. As for the three recessions, output rises in the model from 1920-21. Recalling that this recession has been largely attributed to inept monetary policy (for example, Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) , this is not surprising. Model output also rises during the period of the next, much milder, recession: from 1923-24. In both of these cases, however, model output falls in the year following the actual recession. TFP followed the same pattern: rising during the recession years and falling after. The model, by attributing ‡uctuations only to changes in technology, therefore predicts that both recessions come too late. The recession from 1926-27, is, however, well-captured by the model, with a simultaneous fall in TFP that, as discussed above, re ‡ects the negative technology shock brought on by disruptions related to Ford's closing of his factories to switch from Model T to Model A. 9 
Variable utilization
"E¤orts to measure the percentage utilization of the productive capacity of real capital stocks are to be welcomed as adding to our information on explanatory variables. Unfortunately no reliable long-run measures of this variable are available either for the business economy or for most of its individual divisions." [Kendrick, 1973, 26] There is considerable evidence that utilization rates of capital vary signi…cantly over the short and medium run. The subsequent issue of mismeasurement of TFP at business cycle frequencies goes back at least to Summers' (1986) critique of RBC theory. Unfortunately, we do not have data for capital utilization over our sample period. Potential solutions to this include the use of a proxy. For example, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1995) employ electricity consumption and …nd that adjusted TFP is much less volatile than the naive Solow residual. Data on electricity production is in fact available for the 1920s. However, we are reluctant to use it because of the extraordinary structural changes in manufacturing's use of electricity during the 1920s. It would be hard to distinguish between trend and cycle.
Hence, we instead compute a series of model-consistent utilization rates. 10 In particular, (1) determines the optimal utilization rate as a function of both output and the capital stock. We therefore compute 11 :
: Figure 8 plots the detrended series fu t g. We see an unusually high, persistent and smooth rate of capital utilization during the 1920s: with 1929=100, the index varies only from 94 to 101, and is on average quite high, especially over the later part of the decade. This is followed by a massive drop in utilization at the start of the Great Depression. 12 The high rate in 1941 very likely re ‡ects the e¤ects of the war in Europe on the United States. 13 Next, a new series for total factor productivity is computed, accounting for variable utilization, by
The resulting (log-linearly detrended) series is well-described by a …rst order autoregressive process with = 0:54. 14 Utilization-adjusted TFP is plotted vis-a-vis the naive version in Figure 9 (normalized in 1929). Since utilization of capital did not vary much during the 1920s, we expect the two series to be highly correlated; and their correlation coe¢ cient is in fact 0.99. As is typical, adjusted TFP is less volatile, re ‡ecting factor hoarding. year boom followed by a massive four year drop in 1929. However, when evaluated numerically, for the 1920-1929 stretch the arti…cial economy now performs worse: the correlation falls to 0.58 from 0.84. (Starting from 1922, however, there is a 73% correlation between model and data.) Since TFP again falls only after each of the …rst two recessions, model output falls a year too late in each case. In addition, the model now peaks too early -in 1924; and this peak is about 4% higher than the value in 1929. Adjusting for utilization appears to take out some of the e¤ects of technological progress that the naive accounting suggested for the 1920s. 15 To better understand this result, Figure 11 displays the TFP input from each simulation. The two series correspond to the cycle component from Figure 3 and the equivalent series constructed from utilization-adjusted TFP. While they appear to be almost identical, the movements of utilizationadjusted TFP are usually smaller, again re ‡ecting factor hoarding. The only exception is 1921 in which the adjusted TFP was larger. Again, other factors played a crucial role in this recession. Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 9 , adjusted TFP is higher than the naive version during most of the early 1920s. Together with the stronger propagation mechanism of the endogenous-utilization economy, this produces two e¤ects. First, there is a larger response to TFP's upswing in 1923 and 1924, resulting in output that is too high relative to data. Second, once either model is away from its (stable) steady state, it endogenously reverts back to it. This e¤ect is also stronger in the variable utilization model, so output declines relative to the plain vanilla model, and to the US data. The second e¤ect dominates later, since shocks to TFP are relatively small after 1924. In summary, the predictions for the 1920s of the utilization-corrected model are less successful than those of the standard RBC model.
Concluding remarks
This paper has examined the origins of the Roaring Twenties in the United States. In particular, we applied a version of the real business cycle model to test the hypothesis that an exceptional pace of productivity growth was the driving factor behind eight extraordinary years of economic boom.
Our motivation comes from abundant evidence of signi…cant technological progress during this period. In particular, process innovations and the widespread adoption of electricity in manufacturing and in particular the frictional horsepower electric motor led to economy-wide increases in productivity. Therefore, we have included only technology shocks here. In fact, this paper is the …rst that numerically evaluates the general equilibrium effects of the technological change on the US economy during the 1920s. Using a plain vanilla RBC model, our estimated TFP shocks lead to arti…cial output series that are highly correlated with the data, especially over the period [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] . Since these years are generally considered the de…ning ones for the 1920s, we take it from our analysis, that extraordinary technological change was the main force behind the Roaring Twenties. The model also predicts well the 1926-27 recession. However, when we allow for variable capital utilization, the model is considerably less successful at replicating both the general nature of the decade, and its ups and downs.
In the future we may extend this analysis in several di¤erent directions. More information may be gleaned from a model in which technical change is allowed to be investment-speci…c. In addition, Olney (1991) attributes much of the robustness of growth during the 1920s to the expansion of the availability of credit. A model that incorporates this feature of the economy would shed more light on this unique episode in U.S. economic history.
[32] Smiley, Gene 
Appendix
This Appendix presents robustness checks of our reported results. First, we show that our data representation is not overly dependent on the detrending method. Let us follow Cole and Ohanian (1999) and trend-adjust by dividing output by its 20th century long-run trend growth rate -1.9 percent relative to the reference date. Figure 12 illustrates. Except for the brief 1906-07 boom, the US economy did not spend much time as aloft as in 1920s. Overall, the higher trend does not change the punch-line of our paper. We are reluctant to use the "1.9 percent de ‡ator" since TFP grew at a much smaller rate during the prewar era: the 1892 to 1941 grow rate was about 1.5 percent. Perhaps it is sensible to assume that there was a structural break after the war, in any case, we do not elaborate on this break issue here. Hence, we de ‡ate by the prewar rate in the paper. We also note that our cyclical output time series is very similar to Berry's (1988) . Our other robustness check involves our decision to begin our simulations in 1892 with an initial capital stock 15% below trend. To show the small e¤ect of this-resulting from the low frequency movements of the capital stock -we alternatively begin the simulation in 1919 with an initial capital stock that is ten percent below the model steady state. The ten percent re ‡ect the resulting value after detrending the series on capital. Figure 13 shows that this has a negligible e¤ect. Figure 14 shows that our capital utilization series is very similar to the Federal Reserve Bank's measure. The …t is not perfect but in the absence of any data for the 1920s, we have used our best estimate. The correlation is 0.72 overall, and 0.92 for the …rst twenty years. The two series diverge the most in the second half of the 1990s. This likely re ‡ects IT-related structural changes -i.e. a break in trend -in the US economy (source of data: BEA).
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